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The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Compared
R I C H A R D LEMPERT

Ann Arbor

Visions of Legal Autonomy
During the past decade the effort to understand the place of the legal
system in society has, in England and America, given rise to a renewed
interest in the possibility of legal autonomy (Thompson, 1975; Balbus,
1973; 1977; Trubek, 1977). More recently, on the continent of Europe,
especially in Germany, scholars have focused on an apparently radical form
of autonomy — embodied in the idea of an autopoietic system — in an
effort to understand how law functions (Luhmann, 1985 d; Teubner, 1984).
These two approaches to understanding the legal system paint pictures that
have much in common, but they are differently developed; they are supported by different types of arguments and they are advanced at different
levels of abstraction.
The Anglo-American approach grows out of the empirical untenability
of a crudely instrumental Marxism which posits that law is the barely
disguised instrument by which one class dominates another in all things.
The clearly redistributive elements of the modern welfare state as well as
empirical studies of the treatment of rioters (Balbus, 1973), the enforcement
of Draconian, class-based legislation (Thompson, 1975), and even the law
of slavery (Genovese, 1972; Tushnett, 1975) have shown that the generation
and application of legal norms cannot be explained solely — and sometimes
can hardly be explained at all — by the class positions of involved groups
and parties. It appears, in particular, that the legal system's own norms of
procedure and substance have important implications for the way the law
in the first instance affects the distribution of wealth and power between
parties. The rediscovery of Pashukanis (1980) and theories building on his
work (see e. g., Balbus, 1977, Stone, 1985) have shown that Marxist theories
of social organization are not necessarily threatened by legal norms that
take no explicit account of the class positions of those whose behavior will
fall within the ambit of the law or by the application of legal norms without
regard to the social class or other socio-economic attributes of the parties.
Indeed, some have suggested that legal autonomy in this sense or even,
on occasion, special sensitivity to the interests of the less privileged may
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contribute to capitalist domination by giving a legitimacy to law which
ultimately makes the masses easier to govern (Hay, 1975; Thompson, 1975;
but see Hyde, 1983).
The Continental interest in autopoiesis and its implications for legal
autonomy grows, on the other hand, out of a larger concern with systems
theory and what systems theory approaches imply for social systems. Its
development, to date, is largely associated with the work of one man,
Niklas Luhmann, but as the conference at which this paper was first
presented attests, other Continental social theorists are becoming increasingly attracted to it (see e.g., Teubner, 1984; infra).
The vision of law as an autopoietic system is rooted, as I understand it,
in the idea that society and its major subsystems may be profitably viewed
as autopoietic systems, a perspective that is inspired by recent attempts to
understand the integrity and functioning of biological systems. Autopoiesis
implies a system which is completely closed in the sense that the constitutive
elements of a system are all parts of it, and as such both reproduce and
are reproduced by it. At the same time an autopoietic system is open to
its environment in that the form in which the system reproduces itself
takes account — in its own terms — of the behavior and activity that are
ongoing in its environment. Put another way, environmental activity is
not just or simply mediated by the system of interest (and in this respect
autopoiesis is not just another open systems theory). Its implications are
indirect as the system models the environment in its own terms (Teubner,
1984), proceeding perhaps to reconstitute or even change itself on the basis
of the systemic representation of environmental contingencies. Environmental influences must be indirect because social meanings exist only within
the context of social systems (Luhmann, 1985 b). In the case of law this
involves — to use Luhmann's ambiguous and problematic language — a
system which is at the same time normatively closed and cognitively open
(Luhmann: 1985 d: 6, 7; 1985 c: 113; supra: 19 — 21; see also the discussion
in this paper, infra: 178 — 182). An important implication is that the legal
system takes cognizance of extra-legal activity only in its own terms —
that is, only in terms of what is, according to law, legally relevant.
Although the two visions of legal autonomy are not necessarily incompatible, there are important differences between them. In part these differences
reflect the fact that the Continental vision involves an abstraction (the legal
system as a subsystem of social systems) of an abstraction (social systems
as in some sense like biological systems), while the Anglo-American vision
of legal autonomy is rooted in the failure of earlier theoretical visions to
meet the test of reality.1 Thus, the Anglo-American vision is influenced by
1

In addition to the crudely instrumentalist Marxist vision, there was the earlier
formalistic vision which posited an autonomy so complete that legal action could be
understood as a matter of common sense and logical analysis entirely on the law's
own terms. This vision was destroyed forever when confronted with the common
sense empiricism of the Realists.
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and tends to hew closely to empirical studies of the way in which legal
power articulates with other sources of power in society. The Continental
vision, on the other hand, tends to be abstract — developed by logic,
analogy and a firm a priori theoretical commitment to a model rather than
by examples or confrontation with empirical facts. To the extent that there
is an empirical puzzle that motivates the Continental model, it is found
largely in the widespread sense that there is a law-related crisis in the
regulatory state and that current theories of law neither adequately capture
the reasons for the crisis or (if there is no crisis) for the sense of crisis,
nor provide any guidance for those who would better adapt the legal
system to the demands the regulatory state places on it.
A second difference between the Anglo-American and Continental perspectives on autonomy, which reflects the role that empirical studies have
played in each, is that the Anglo-American approach seeks to abstract a
theory of legal autonomy from the actual operations of the legal system in
particular situations. This gives Anglo-American theories a somewhat static
quality; so long as society is organized along essentially the same socioeconomic lines, the implications of autonomy for the legal system remain
essentially the same. Autopoiesis in so far as it posits continual openness
to the environment posits continual — albeit system dictated — responses
to changes in environmental conditions, which means continual responses
to changes in other subsystems of society and to changes in the encompassing social system. Indeed, autopoietic systems exist only through their
autopoiesis which implies constant reconstitution with concomitant "molecular" changes. Thus, the Continental theory more than the American theory
lends itself to the study of legal evolution or, more precisely, adaptation
(Teubner, infra).
A third difference is most curious. Although conflict theory, including
modern Marxism, is generally regarded as the dominant response to functionalist theories in sociology, a good deal of functionalism underlies the
Anglo-American perspective on legal autonomy. This is, no doubt, in part
because the theory has its genesis in the perceived failure of the conflict
model — carried to an extreme — to explain legal behavior. Beyond this
the idea of legal autonomy is tied to the ways law serves society. The
predominant explanation of why something like the rule of law persists in
modern capitalist societies — legitimacy — is functionalism in the service
of a conflict perspective.
The idea of autopoiesis on the other hand, although advanced by the
leading modern functionalist, does not in itself suggest a functionalist
justification for the autonomy the legal system enjoys. If the legal system
is autopoietically organized it will enjoy the autonomy associated with
autopoietic systems regardless of whether and what social functions it fills.
It could hardly be otherwise. The legal system reconstitutes itself according
to distinctly legal values rather than under the direct influence of the needs
of some other system of society. Functionalism is brought in only by the
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back door, so to speak. The legal system, Luhmann hypothesizes in another
of the more problematic aspects of his theory, fulfills a distinct function
in society relating to the management of disputes (Luhmann, 1985 c: 120;
supra: 27 —29). 2 It is, according to Luhmann, only because the legal system
fills this particular function and fills it uniquely that it is and can be
autopoietically organized.
Given the basic convergence of two different perspectives on an idea of
legal autonomy, together with the different sources of inspiration for the
two perspectives, and the differences in the way the two theories have been
advanced, it should be of interest and one hopes it will be instructive to
confront one perspective with another. What I propose to do in this paper
is to construct a theory of legal autonomy rooted in the Anglo-American
perspective (although not derived from a concern for an empirically tenable
Marxism). 3 1 shall then turn to Luhmann's work on autopoiesis to examine
ways in which the idea of autopoiesis accords or conflicts with the theory
I develop and to contrast the theoretical adequacy of the two perspectives. 4
Before doing this, however, we must confront one more issue, namely the
theoretical status of Luhmann's attempt to extend the ideal of autopoiesis
from the living systems the term was coined to describe to social systems.

Theory or Metaphor
Some authors (e. g., Teubner, infra) suggest that the idea of autopoiesis as
applied to social systems is essentially a metaphor. If it is only this, there
2

3

4

Luhmann is obliged to allow for the creation of disputes to generate norms in order
to maintain the integrity of his functionalism. The effort, as I will argue (infra: 182—
185) seems strained and unsatisfactory.
The theory I construct draws heavily on portions of Chapters 12 and 13 in a book I
have coauthored with Professor Joseph Sanders of the Houston Law School entitled,
An Invitation to Law and Social Science (Lempert and Sanders, 1986). Although I may
refer to this theory as the Anglo-American theory I do this for convenience and to
indicate the origins of the work that immediately inspired it, rather than to claim a
special status for it. The theory I offer is neither the Anglo-American theory nor
necessarily a typical representative of the theoretical perspectives developed by AngloAmerican writers. It is, however, heavily influenced by the theoretical and empirical
work of authors in the Anglo-American tradition, although tracing it to its roots it
is the influence of a continental scholar, Max Weber, that predominates. The work of
two liberal theorists, Nonet and Selznick (1978) also contributed in important ways
to the development of this theory.
Obviously, I cannot claim to be unbiased in this enterprise. My critique of the theory
of autopoiesis is, however, not motivated by a desire to promote my own perspective,
and I realize that the theoretical adequacy of the perspective I offer is neither
established nor very much enhanced by questioning aspects of the theory of autopoiesis
and suggesting that my theory compares favorably to it. It is, I assume, understandable
if I leave to others the task of pointing out weaknesses in my preferred theoretical
position.
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are important implications for the likely utility of the concept and for the
criticisms that may be fairly made of it (Rottleuthner, infra). Metaphors
are useful because they provide a novel way of seeing. One thing unlike
another in many respects is seen in some important respect to be similar.
Metaphors, however, are neither false nor true; they cannot be tested
against reality or some indication of it, and simpler metaphors are not
necessarily preferable to more elaborate characterizations. Ultimately metaphors can only be judged by whether they are helpful or unhelpful. While
it is often the case that the ability of a metaphor to stimulate insights will
diminish with the distance between the original (ordinary) and metaphorical
uses of a term, this is not necessarily the case, for even obviously false
metaphors may lead to a greater understanding of both the object described
and the perceptions of the observer ("What light through yonder window
breaks? It is the east, and Juliet is the sun"). Thus, if the idea of the
autopoietic social (legal) system is only a metaphor, we can suspect it of
misleading because of the obvious differences between social and biological
systems, 5 or we may value it for the insight it gives us into the workings
of social systems or into the perceptions of such an acute observer of social
systems as Niklas Luhmann. We cannot, however, treat the application of
the concept to social systems as valid or invalid. We can only react
subjectively to its utility and try to say why we do or do not find it helpful
to think about social systems as autopoietic entities.
I, however, read Luhmann as offering more than a metaphor. He offers
a theory about how social systems work. He is, as I read his work, trying
to persuade other social scientists that he has a generally useful, rather than
an idiosyncratically stimulating, scheme for understanding the operation of
actual legal systems and explaining problems they confront. This scheme
or theory is, to be sure, born of the resemblance that Luhmann sees
between social systems and biological systems that are, according to another
theory, autopoietically organized. But as a social theory, Luhmann's autopoiesis is neither validated by that resemblance nor invalidated by the
obvious differences between biological and social systems. Nor is the crucial
question whether the idea of the autopoietic social system is subjectively
enlightening. In evaluating theories and their likely utility, we confront
different issues: we are concerned with whether a theory is empirically
testable; we are concerned with how the theory, or the implication we
draw from it, accords with our empirically-based perceptions of that which
the theory purports to explain; and we are concerned with the position of
the theory in relation to other theories. The theory should be consistent
with other well-grounded theories, or it should, by explaining everything
5

Luhmann notes that the concept of autopoiesis as originally developed in biology
was not meant to be and cannot be applied to social systems (Luhmann, 1985 c: 122
at note 26; 1985 a: 2).
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they do and more, supersede them. If the theory gives rise to the same
expectations as a plausible alternative, we should apply the test of Ockham's
razor; that is, when two theoretical explanations are equally consistent with
the range of what can be observed, the simpler explanation is preferred.
Thus, in evaluating the Continental vision of legal autonomy exemplified
in Luhmann's elaboration on the concept of autopoiesis and in contrasting
it with the (an) Anglo-American vision as represented by my views on the
partial autonomy of law, the Continental vision is not necessarily made
more plausible by the possibility or even the reality of autopoietic biological
systems nor is it made less plausible by the differences between biological
and social systems. What is crucial in considering each vision is how each
lends itself to empirical testing (at least "in principle"), how each accords
with reality in so far as we can determine it, and how each fares by the
criterion of simplicity. To put this another way, insofar as the goal is to
understand the workings of the legal system, I believe that theories of
legal autonomy, whether Anglo-American or Continental, are part of the
enterprise we call positivist social science.

The Requisites of Legal Autonomy
By an autonomous legal system I mean one which in the ideal case is
independent of other sources of power and authority in social life. Legal
action, be it a decision to prosecute, an award of damages, or the reapportionment of a state legislature, is in an autonomous system influenced only
by the pre-established rules of the legal system. These rules determine not
only the consequences of social action, but also — for all legal purposes —
its meaning, and it is from the assigned meaning that legal consequences
follow (cf. Teubner 1983; 1984).
If the law is to be autonomous in the sense of defining events in its own
terms and detailing the consequences that follow, it must be independent of
society's other mechanisms of social control. Although law is itself part of
the governing apparatus of the state, its actions and conceptions must be
uncontrolled by the political branches of government; that is, free from
the influence of those branches that respond to and embody power relations
in society. Although it must abstract cases from and return solutions to
the larger society (Bohannan, 1965), it must be uninfluenced by the power
and status differences that permeate social life. And although law is itself
a normative system, it must remain impervious to the ethical codes of the
surrounding society.
If autonomy in these senses is to be realized, the legal system should be
autonomous in one further sense. It must be self-legitimating, for to depend
upon political, social or ethical forces for authority is to be vulnerable to
the encroachment of such forces on decision making. A legal system is
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self-legitimating when its rules and rulings are accepted because they are
legal, or to borrow Hart's (1961) helpful terms, a legal system is selflegitimating when its primary rules and statements of them are accepted
as binding because they are enacted in accordance with the system's
secondary rules. Thus, in a self-legitimating legal system, a law will be
recognized if it is duly enacted and the legal system itself determines what
is meant by "duly". Similarly, a court ruling will be regarded as binding
because it specifies the implications of a primary rule (i. e., a substantive
law, like the law of theft) for the parties in accordance with appropriate
secondary rule procedures (i. e., procedural rules, like the rules of evidence
and the rules of procedural due process).
Understood in these terms the autonomy of a legal system is, at best, a
relative matter; that is, it can be at most partial. The legal system exists as
part of the social system, and legal activity involves a constant interplay
with other sectors of society. Empirically, it would be surprising if any
legal system could fully resist the influences of popular ethics or political
or social power. It would be similarly surprising if a legal system could
maintain its legitimacy if its primary rules, however properly enacted,
continually clashed with generally accepted ethical precepts or with the
interests of those who enjoy political and social power.
But the problem is more than empirical. Complete legal autonomy is,
even in theory, unattainable. Law is a normative system and its norms
must, at least in the first instance, come from somewhere. 6 Furthermore,
most legal systems have secondary rules describing procedures by which
new laws can be made. These procedures usually allow for the orderly
incorporation of extralegal values into the legal system. In the process the
legal system is necessarily penetrated by interests external to it.
Two aspects of the way law incorporates values are especially important.
First, the values infused into law may be more or less specific. Thus, the
law may seek to set the price of corn at the desired level of so many dollars
per bushel or it may try to establish the conditions for a free market in
corn on the theory that any price reached in a free market exchange is
desirable. Second, except in periods of revolution or other massive social
change, new laws — that is new instances of value infusion — are embedded
in an encompassing legal culture. In the process, laws may be transformed
so that their ultimate behavioral implications are not precisely as intended.

6

Weber (1968), in describing rational legal authority, which is self-legitimating in the
way I describe above, postulated a legal code that was gapless in the sense that one
could derive logically from the code legal implications for any possible case that
might arise under it. In this sense the legal system is fully self-contained. However,
that code must have its roots in some external institution(s) and in this sense at least
the legal system will be penetrated by the norms and power relations of the larger
society.
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The more autonomous the legal system, the greater the transformation is
likely to be. In the extreme case a law, for example an ex post facto law,
will have no legal effect because the legal culture will contain higher norms
that nullify the attempt at value infusion.
To say that law is autonomous in the partial sense that is empirically
possible is to say that law is to some extent a product of itself and implies
that legal power alone may influence social life. The claim of partial
autonomy does not deny the possibility that law, insofar as it purports to
regulate social life, may do nothing more than reinstitutionalize the norms
and values of some other authority system (Bohannan, 1965). But it does
mean that once reinstitutionalization has occurred, legal norms and values
and the actions these entail are no longer fully reducible to the actions,
norms and values of that other system and so may have an independent
influence on social life.
Law is influenced by the political, ethical or social order, but this does
not mean that the law must be in essence a tool of the dominant class's
immediate self-interest, the plaything of those in high office or the obedient
servant of some moral majority. If it is important to recognize that law is
only partially autonomous, it is also important to realize that partial
autonomy can allow for considerable self-direction.

Relative Autonomy
If legal autonomy is necessarily only partial, there is no point in simply
asking whether a legal system is autonomous or not. We must focus instead
on relative autonomy, for the interesting questions are whether and why
legal autonomy is more or less achieved. 7 We may think of the relative

autonomy of law as the degree to which the legal system looks to itself rather than
to the standards of some external social, political or ethical system for guidance in
making or applying law. The legal system can look to itself because it has a
set of forms (e. g., plaintiff, defendant, battery, divorce, contract, liable,
guilty, etc.) to which it can fit actors and actions. These forms cloak
behavior with distinctively legal meanings that entail specific consequences.

7

While complete legal autonomy may be impossible empirically, the complete absence
of autonomy in the sense that the law's commands are reduced to those of some nonlegal political or ethical system is conceivable from the Anglo-American perspective.
Arguably the polity has dictated all important legal activity in some totalitarian states
at some times and the extra-legal norms of religion have apparently had a similar
influence in Calvin's Geneva and Khomeni's Iran, to name just two instances. The
autopoietic perspective would treat these instances as examples of the replacement of
law by another autopoietically organized control system. See the discussion in this
paper, infra: 174.
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Autonomy is infringed when a group or interest is able to influence the
legal process so that its own standards or interests are embedded in forms
the law recognizes or in the rules that link forms to consequences. Thus
to understand why law is more or less autonomous, we must identify
characteristics that distinguish legal systems that are substantially dominated
by the interests and standards of external groups from those that are less
so.
Distinctions may be made along two dimensions. The first involves the
extent to which a standard once embedded in law acquires meaning through
the law's own canons of construction rather than by reference to the
interests that gave it birth. Where the law's canons of construction dominate, the law will be more autonomous of the external system than where
they do not. For example, consider a law forbidding check forgery. Assume
this law is designed to facilitate capitalist economic transactions. To this
extent the law is penetrated by capitalist interests. At the same time the
law appears to reflect a generally accepted ethical proposition about how
people should and should not acquire property. Suppose Sam, a clever
criminal, drains Jane's bank account not by forging her check but by
fraudulently inducing her to write a genuine check in exchange for a
promise to deliver goods that Sam neither owned nor intended to deliver.
Sam is then charged with forgery under the statute. If the legal system
looks either to the capitalist interests that secured the forgery statute or to
the popular ethical code, it might convict because fraud of this sort both
threatens the free exchange of checks and offends popular morality. But
by certain legal canons of construction forgery is not the same as fraud,
and by a further canon no one should be punished unless his behavior has
been previously and specifically declared criminal. Since the legislature
seeking to protect the security of checks overlooked the need to protect
against fraud, if the law's canons of constructions control Sam will escape
on a "technicality": the legislature neglected to define his crime. Legal
systems that look to their own canons of construction to determine the
meaning of law rather than to external morality or the interests that support
the law are more autonomous than those that take the opposite approach. 8
The second dimension that allows us to distinguish more autonomous
legal systems from less autonomous ones is the degree of generality in
which laws are cast. The more general the form in which a law is cast, the
less close will be the tie between the legal norm and the interests of a
particular status group. Thus, a system that forbids anyone from forging

8

I do not mean to suggest by this example that the law's canons of construction are
rigid or that a foreordained logic inexorably controls. Llewelyn (1950) has shown
that the common law's stock of canons is sufficiently diverse that it would allow
considerable flexibility of interpretation even if there were a rule, which there is not,
that in interpreting a statute a court must always cite some relevant canon.
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a check is more autonomous than one which protects only capitalists from
forgery. 9 Put another way, a legal system characterized by general rules
is likely to be more autonomous than one riddled with particularistic
enactments.
The first of these dimensions, the degree to which external interests
influence legal construction, is more important in assessing the degree of
autonomy that characterizes the law application process while the second,
the degree of generality, relates more closely to law making. One important
point they have in common is that the more autonomous law is along both
of these dimensions the more legal concepts can be manipulated without
apparent reference to the particular substantive concerns that led to the
legal norm in the first instance. Laws, in other words, are distanced
from narrow, externally grounded, substantive concerns both through the
generality of their content and by internally defined rules of interpretation.
The ideal of legal autonomy can be more closely achieved in the law
application or judicial process 10 than in the law creation or legislative
process. The legislature sits at the intersection of the political and legal
spheres. It may be captured by interests and organizations that have
substantial social power, and it often responds to the entreaties of those
who support private ethical systems. This does not mean that the concept
of autonomy has no place in a discussion of legislation. I shall later discuss
some senses in which we can speak of legislation as being more or less
autonomous. But the bulk of what follows shall focus on the way laws are
applied by courts.

Judicial Formalism
Autonomy in the law application process is characterized by and is to a
large extent attributable to judicial formalism (cf. Nonet and Selznick, 1978:
60 — 65). Judicial formalism is in turn characterized by three concerns:
a concern for procedure, a concern for rules, and a concern for legal
categories.

9

10

This might be done not only in so many words, but also by protecting business
checks from forgery but not the checks of individuals. If the possibility that such an
undisguised class-based distinction will enter the law appears remote, consider the
numerous societies that had laws broadly protecting masters from violence at the
hands of their slaves but only narrowly or not at all protecting slaves from violence
at the hands of their masters.
Law application also involves nonjudicial agencies such as the police and prosecutors.
The analysis of judicial autonomy might be extended to consider action in these
spheres but for simplicity's sake we shall confine our textual attention to courts and
administrative tribunals.
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1. A Concern for Procedure
The elevation of procedural concerns above more immediately substantive
ones is perhaps the distinguishing feature — and to some the most jarring
feature — of a formal legal system. For example, in Dobbert v. Wainwright
several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, refused to
consider Dobbert's claim that he was about to be executed for behavior
that under Florida law did not constitute a capital offense. Review was
refused because ten years earlier in 1974, the accused's counsel had not
objected at trial to a jury instruction that may have erroneously defined
the accused's behavior as capital, and the matter was not raised on a first
federal appeal. 11 At the other extreme, likely murderers may go free because
the rules of evidence preclude the admission of the most probative evidence
against them. In between the extremes are more prosaic cases that arise
every day in which outcomes are partly or entirely determined by a litigant's
inability or failure to comply with one of the law's procedural rules.
To say that in these cases the law elevates procedure above substance is
accurate when one considers only the substantive merits of a claim, but
from the perspective of the legal system it is somewhat misleading. There
are usually good substantive reasons that justify the law's procedural rules
and the influence they have. The rule that conditions the preservation of
error on objections at trial is, for example, justified by the praiseworthy
objective of promoting efficiency since if objections are made at trial, errors
might be corrected there and costly retrials avoided.
Thus, the fact that the law may insist on honoring its procedural rules
when injustice apparently results should not be condemned as an elevation
of form for its own sake over substance. Nevertheless, there is a problem
here. Where judicial formalism prevails, the law's preference schedule
appears to many as unduly self-regarding. The values that underlie legal
procedures tend to "trump" the apparent demands of substantive justice
without regard to the relative merits of the competing claims. In Dobbert,
for example, we might think that preventing the execution of a man for
behavior that the state never made punishable by death, is worth any slight,
long run erosion in the rule requiring that objections be made at trial.
It is only the court's privileged position with respect to the law that
allows it to impose system-regarding legal values in settings where ethical
or political considerations call strongly for different action. It is this ability
to hew to distinctively legal values and the propensity of courts to do so
that makes the law's procedural orientation an important component of
11

Dobbert v. Wainwrigbt, cert, denied, 105 Sup. Ct. 34; 43 (1984), opinion of Marshall,
J. dissenting. The case was also one in which the jury that convicted the defended
recommended mercy by a 10—2 vote, but the judge, as is permitted under Florida
law, ignored the recommendation and imposed a death sentence.
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legal autonomy. Moreover, this component can have important consequences when the law comes to be applied. 12 As Thompson (1975), Balbus
(1977), and others have shown, the formal requirement that those who
proceed through law conform to pre-existing legal procedures has important implications for the realization of the values that law or its administration aim at.

2. A Concern for Rules
The second aspect of judicial formalism is a concern for what legal rules
require. A formalist judge treats the law as given. He does not in deciding
cases try to promote some extra-legal value system, even one congruent
with the law, but looks to the law as the source of all values. What the
law requires must be done, and what the law does not forbid is allowed.
Thus, a hungry child may be sentenced to death for picking pockets in
search of the wherewithal to live, and one who steals money entrusted to
him for investment may escape without any punishment if the law of theft
at the time forbids only forcible takings.
Being guided by exclusively legal norms does not mean that the formal
judge looks only to the legislature for guidance. Depending on the system,
legal norms may be drawn from such sources as constitutions, the rulings
of administrative agencies, treaties, proclamations by high officials, and
prior court decisions. Nor does the internal orientation mean that a court
cannot declare a law invalid. Courts recognize hierarchies of law, and
constitutional provisions can override legislation just as legislation can
reverse non-constitutional judicial precedent. What distinguishes the formalist system with respect to both the sources of legal norms and the ways
conflicts are resolved among them is that it is the legal system's rules that
determine what is permissible. Thus, a formalist judge does not enforce
administrative restrictions on pollution because he thinks they are desirable.
Rather the rules are enforced because the legislature has delegated the
authority to regulate by rule to an agency and the legislature has the legal

12

In particular, attempts to use the law to achieve specific ends may be hampered by
legal rules of procedure. The exclusionary rule, for example, has implications for how
the war against narcotic drugs is fought. Advertisements found to be misleading by
the Federal Trade Commission may be broadcast for years while advertisers exhaust
their appeals. The right to jury trial has at one time or another helped injury victims
secure adequate compensation from the giants of industry, restrained governmental
efforts to censor or oppress those w h o disagreed with official policies, hampered
efforts to enforce game laws in rural areas and allowed people w h o had violently
resisted desegregation to escape punishment. A s this potpourri of examples illustrates,
procedural formalism may inhibit the law's ability to achieve a variety of political and
legislative ends, for as measured by any external political or social standard there is
no necessary consistency in how the law's allegiance to procedure will cut.
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(in this case constitutional) authority to do so. Similarly a formalist judge
will strike down legislation he thinks desirable if it conflicts with the
Constitution. Thus, a judge, citing the First Amendment, may strike down
laws seeking to prevent the degradation of women through pornography
although he subscribes to the ideological and empirical assumptions that
motivated the legislation.
Perhaps most surprisingly, treating pre-existing law as the source of all
legal norms does not prevent the formalist judge from making law, if by
making law we mean the elaboration of doctrine to fit specific behavior.
The important point is that in making law the formalist judge looks not
to some external ethical system or political interest but looks inward to
the law and asks what, if anything, the body of law fairly and logically
implies for the behavior that has come to the court's attention. This
determination involves a close inspection of the language of the law and
an effort to interpret that language in the light of the lawgiver's meaning.
Taking rules as given enhances autonomy in the judicial or law application process because it relegates all political and ethical considerations to
another sphere, the sphere of the lawmaker (Nonet and Selznick, 1978:
57 — 8). The concerns that motivate the lawmakers are taken into account
only as an aid in interpreting language whose logical implications are not
clear; so what may appear from one perspective as making new law is from
another only the determination and logical application of what was meant
by the old. 13
3. A Concern for Legal Categories
The third element of formalism is the tendency to fit actions, actors, and,
in particular, statutory language into legal forms. Thus, people and actions
are in a formal legal system abstracted from their social settings and treated
as members of predefined legal categories. Once this is done, applying law
involves only the proper categorization of acts and actions and the logical
manipulation of concepts internal to the legal system.
A formalist judge interprets a statute in terms of the rights and duties
it creates and then applies the statute by logically analyzing the implication
of these rights and duties for the parties before the court. The specification
of the statutorily created rights may consider the purposes of the statute,
but once the rights have been specified the original purpose fades from
view. The system is autonomous in that it no longer attends to the political
and ethical concerns that spurred the legislation but operates only with
legal concepts. If the legislature did not specify rights sufficient to achieve
the goals it had in mind, a formalist jurisprudence will mean that the goal
13

Attention to rules, like attention to procedure, may lead to substantive injustice and,
for better or worse, interfere with attempts at regulation.
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will not be achieved. This contrasts with a more substantively oriented
jurisprudence that interprets rights on a case by case basis with an eye in
each instance to the achievement of a legislative or constitutionally given
end.
The tendency of courts to fit actors into legal categories that obscure
social differences and to treat substantive legislation not entirely in its own
purposive terms but in terms of the rights and obligations that can be
abstracted out of the legislation poses problems for those who attempt to
use the law to attain substantive ends. Statutes as reinterpreted by courts
often do both more and less than is intended. They do less because the
purposes of the statute may be blunted or its scope narrowed when the
focus is on the rights or obligations the statute clearly entails. Furthermore,
when the differential opportunities that people have to invoke the law are
not acknowledged many potential litigants may be denied that access to
the legal process which is necessary if the substantive goals of the statute
are to be realized.
Formalism can allow legislation to do more than intended because the
tendency to focus on formalistic abstractions may lead to a reading of the
law that covers situations that were not within the intended scope of the
Act or extends benefits to classes of litigants who were not intended
beneficiaries of the law's protections. Thus, a law that provides that medical
school applicants may not be discriminated against because of sex may
have been intended to eliminate discrimination in medical school admissions
in order to open up to women a profession once largely closed to them.
However, if a court focuses on the sex-neutral term "applicant" and ignores
the substantive end in view, the law might be used to strike down, at the
instance of a male applicant, an affirmative action program that promises
to increase substantially the proportion of physicians who are female. In
such circumstances a court by extending rights in ways not contemplated
by the legislature may undermine the very goals a law was intended to
serve.
The three aspects of formalism that we have just described all serve to
distance the law as it applied from the interests of external ethical and
political systems, even to some degree when those interests have captured
the legislative process and embedded their preferences into law. For this
reason judicial formalism goes a long way toward ensuring legal autonomy.

Other Aspects of Autonomy
While legal formalism as I have defined it is a central constituent of legal
autonomy it is not the only one. If access to the law or the ability to use
it effectively varies with political power or social status, these disparities
will affect how the law is applied even if the court takes no official account
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of extra-legal status. For example, if filing fees and attorneys' costs are
such that low income debtors cannot afford to defend themselves when
sued, the judicial output will disproportionately reflect the interests of
wealthy litigants. Legal rights belonging to the less well-off will not be
recognized because they will not be effectively asserted. Also, if those legal
norms the formalist court treats as given take extra-legal status into account,
the judicial output will reflect this. While the formal application of a law
designed to promote the ethics or interests of one group over another may
leaven the substantive orientation of the law, the rights and duties that are
abstracted from the law and enforced will consistently favor one set of
interests over another.
Thus, the autonomy of the legal system in action also depends on the
degree to which all actors can invoke the law effectively, a matter we may
call legal competence (Galanter, 1974), and on the quality of the laws that are
invoked.
1. Legal Competence
If those who use or are subject to the law are of unequal legal competence,
the judicial output over the run of cases will reflect this inequality. For
legal competence to be equal, parties to a dispute must have equal access
to legal remedies and must be equally capable of influencing judicial
outcomes. If such equality exists, the court's decision should be determined
entirely by the law as it applies to the facts of the case. Except insofar as
the law takes into account the parties' extra-legal status, extra-legal sources
of authority will have no effect on the decision.
Thus, equal legal competence is the second crucial ingredient of legal
autonomy. Formalism guarantees that the law will be applied by reference
to legal norms and procedures. But without equal legal competence formal
adjudication will yield outcomes that disproportionately favor the more
powerful and better off and to this extent reinforce social disparities that
the law does not recognize. The better off are advantaged both because
they are better able to bring or avoid litigation and because once in court
they are better able to muster the facts and legal arguments that aid courts
in determining how the law should be applied. To the extent that the ideal
of equal competence breaks down, the legal system will be less autonomous,
for although the court may be blind to extra-legal power and status
differences, its output will reflect such disparities.
Success at law is clearly linked to success in social life (Galanter, 1974;
1976). Those who are legally competent have usually succeeded in other
areas as well. Yet even in an unequal society partial autonomy may endure.
Law as it is applied in the United States, for example, tends to ameliorate
rather than simply reproduce power discrepancies. Institutions like the
contingent fee and legal rules like the right to appointed counsel in criminal
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cases together with legal formality tend to equalize the situation of parties
who go to law. Nor are these efforts empty. Judges at and before trial
routinely make rulings that disadvantage the more powerful litigant, juries
regularly acquit defendants who have been prosecuted with all the financial
and symbolic power the state can muster. Appointed counsel often work
diligently for their clients, and some of the most important victories that
poor people have won as a class have been engineered by lawyers on the
state's payroll.14
2. Normative Neutrality and Status Neutral Law
At the plane of the ideal, we have identified two of the conditions that
must be met if the legal system is to be autonomous and thereby resist the
penetration of the social, political and ethical systems that surround it.
First, the law must be applied in a formal, self-regarding way, which means
that legal disputes are decided by reference to legal norms and categories
in accordance with pre-existing legal procedures. Second, actors must be
equally competent in their use of law. Without such equality the socially
better off will disproportionately benefit from a formal law application
process.
Both formality and equal competence are at best only partially achieved
in modern Western societies. Could they be fully achieved, the law would
be autonomously applied. But even if they were fully achieved, the law as
applied would not necessarily be autonomous of distributional patterns
rooted in other social systems.15 For built into the very texture of the law
are norms that redistribute values from one political or social group to
another. Such laws not only reflect and attract influence attempts by
extra-legal interests, but they also mean that the applied law will have
substantively different implications for differently situated groups. The
quality of applied law, although not necessarily the law application process,
will be shaped by extra-legal rather than legally-defined statuses. Thus there

14

15

Whether partial autonomy as it exists in the U. S. is a glass that is half full or half
empty depends on one's attitude and where one looks. The death penalty for rape in
the South, for example, was a practical matter largely reserved for black men w h o
raped white women (Wolfgang and Reidel, 1973). The lack of effective legal counsel
no doubt contributed to this.
Here I may appear to be expanding my conception of what legal autonomy requires
in the pure case. It is not just that the process of interpreting and applying law must
be uninfluenced by extra-legal circumstances, but also that the law must not in the
abstract or as applied make people differentially eligible for its rewards and
punishments based on some prior (that is, having nothing to do with the behavior
being evaluated) social status. Unless this condition is met, the law in its application
will be inescapably bound up with the fate of extra-legal status groups and will tend
in its application to be a tool in service of extralegal status interests.
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is a final ingredient to pure legal autonomy. The law both as written and
applied must not make distinctions on the basis of differences in social
status. We may call this normative neutrality in that legal norms do not
systematically favor one status group or another in the contests for welfare
and power that people engage in in other spheres.
Focusing first on legal language we see that some law, including much
of the common law, fits this description. It gives actors rights apart from
their social or political status. Thus, anyone may own property and those
who own property are generally free to use it or transfer it as they see fit.
Anyone injured through the fault of another may recover in tort. And
within broad limits anyone may enter into a contract with another that
will be enforced in court. We may think of such law as status neutral law.
Status neutral law, that is, law that on its face attaches no special benefits
to social, political or ethical status, is essential if normative neutrality is to
be achieved. Thus, one way normative neutrality can fail is that law may
be overtly oriented to external political, ethical, or social considerations.
But status neutral law, although lacking in such overt substantive orientations, will not yield a normatively neutral legal order if it is applied in a
world where considerable inequality exists.
Because status neutral law eschews the task of setting social directions
and recognizes only the values of individualism, if a court applies such
norms formalistically, the resulting outcomes will have an appearance of
neutrality. Extra-legal distinctions will not have been imported into the
law and will have no place in the legal analysis. Yet in an unequal society
the formal analysis will tend to enforce power relationships that exist
outside the law. Those who have substantial social power will be able to
use the law to reaffirm the advantages they have over others in their day
to day affairs.
If all laws were "status neutral" in the sense I use the term; if people
were equally well situated to take advantage of status neutral rules and
entitlements; and if the other requisites of legal autonomy were met, the
ideal of pure legal autonomy would be achieved. The legal system would
proceed in a purely self-regarding way. The law application process would
in accordance with its own procedures manipulate distinctively legal concepts in the light of legal norms. A party's extra-legal status would have
no implications for either his rights — since these would be equally
accessible to all — or his treatment in court. Similar social action would
everywhere have the same legal implications. Thus, in the ideal case legal
autonomy and personal autonomy coincide. Freedom is at a maximum.16

16

I mean this phrase descriptively and do not mean to imply that in these circumstances
one would have the best of all possible worlds. Thus when I speak of the "ideal of
pure legal autonomy" I am referring to an ideal type and mean to make no suggestion
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The Empirical Failure of Autonomy
To sum up briefly, I have argued that the autonomous application of law
depends on three factors: judicial formalism; equal legal competence, and
normative neutrality. Only if they are simultaneously realized in an already
equal society will the ideal of pure autonomy exist. I f this is so, three
conclusions follow. First, a purely autonomous system of law application
in the strict sense I have used the term "autonomous" is in theory possible.
Nothing about the nature of adjudicative institutions or the societies in
which they exist suggest that in principle these conditions cannot be
achieved. Second, these conditions are not achieved in any society. Hence,
as an empirical matter, law as applied is at best partially autonomous.
Third, again as an empirical matter, in some societies these conditions are
to some extent achieved. The judiciary in many states does distance itself
from pressures to respond to non-legal interests by its special concern for
procedure, rules and legal categories; concerns that taken together make
up formalism. Equal legal competence does not exist, but institutions like
the right to appointed counsel, public interest law firms, and the contingent
fee mean that for some individuals and groups removing contests to the
legal sphere generally provides a more equal arena for struggle than that
which may be found in other sectors of society. Finally, some legislation
is status neutral in its implications and many societies are not so unequal
as to ensure that status neutral law will in each instance advantage the
socially more powerful party. Putting these factors together I conclude that
the application of law in Western democracies is best characterized as a
partially autonomous process. But the implications of autonomy in application for the autonomy of the legal system as a whole cannot be determined
until we consider the source of the norms that the system applies and how
these relate to non-legal political, ethical and social interests. This draws
our attention to the legislative process and the possibility of autonomy in
law-making.

The Possibility of Legislative Autonomy
The legislature sits at the intersection between the political and legal spheres
where it is open to the influence of wealth as well as to other sources of
social and political power and to the vociferous entreaties of those who
support private ethical systems. At the same time the legislature is a crucial
legal actor, for it pours norms into the judicial and regulatory systems. It

about whether the ideal is a goal worth achieving. My own tastes involve a communitarian element that might not be compatible with this "ideal" order.
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is fair to ask whether a legislature can ever share the partial autonomy we
have thus far identified with law. I f not, the autonomy of law is likely to
be of little moment, for the stock of legal forms and concepts that regulate
and sanction behavior will soon reflect the interests of powerful extra-legal
status groups. My view is that as a conceptual matter a legal system that
is open to legislation can never be fully autonomous because at its heart
is an institution designed to translate extra-legal interests into law. It does
not, however, follow that openness to legislation means that autonomy of
application is of little moment. Legislatures I shall argue may be sufficiently
distanced from specific extra-legal interests that their output need not
directly translate some identifiable extralegal standard of behavior into law.
Thus, as an empirical matter I believe that the partial autonomy we see in the
legal systems of the capitalist democracies reflects meaningful independence
from extralegal sources of authority.
There are several reasons why some degree of legislative autonomy is
possible. First, the structure of the legislature contributes to its ability to
act autonomously. Interests groups can capture legislator/, but it is difficult
to generate a coalition to capture the legisla/»re. Thus, the ready translation
of the interests of social, political, or ethical groups in ways that substantially threaten, rather than simply fail to promote, the interests of others
is difficult to achieve. In some countries, like the United States, this
difficulty is enhanced by constitutional requirements for super majorities
when fundamental liberty interests or the independence of the courts is
directly threatened, and by the veto power given to an executive.
Second, there are distinctively legal norms about the form, content and
procedure of legislation which legislatures routinely honor. Some norms
such as the prohibition in the United States of ex post facto laws and bills
of attainder are written into constitutions. Others such as the need to
respect the separate jurisdictions of the judiciary and executive are implied
by one. Still others such as the preference for legislation that fits in as far
as possible with the body of existing law and the idea that legislation
should be open to public comment are part of the legislative culture.
Adherence to such cultural rules not only promotes autonomy in legislation,
but is itself an important expression of it.
Third, in the United States by long-standing practice and in other
countries to differing degrees, the judiciary, the branch of government best
insulated from the pressures that threaten autonomy, has authority to void
specific legislative enactments.
Finally, law as a body may be autonomous of specific external interests
in a way that individual laws are not. While particular laws may reflect the
influence of identifiable status groups, the body of laws may mix such a
variety of concerns that the legal system can be identified with no particular
external interests, except possibly at the highest level of generality, such as
whites in a segregated society or the propertied in a class-stratified society.
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Moreover, not all instances of externally oriented legislative behavior reflect
the influence of some special interest group. Some norms — like much of
the criminal law — are so generally accepted in society that the legislative
reinstitutionalization of these norms is not problematic. While in one sense
those laws are the antithesis of autonomy in that the ethical and legal are
collapsed, when the collapsing is complete the law may be applied without
reference to any specific external norms or interests. In a society where all
laws and ethical propositions were of this type, we would have neither a
legal system nor an ethical system but a legio-ethical system which could
act autonomously of other interests in society.
These features of the legislative process, and others that I have no doubt
missed, mean that legislation is insulated to some extent from the pressures
of particular extra-legal interests and is shaped to some extent by distinctively legal concerns. They do not mean that legislatures are autonomous
in the way courts are. As I have previously noted, even at the level of the
ideal, there are fundamental differences. The formalist court, as I argued
earlier, takes legal norms as given and in this sense can be entirely selfregarding 17 in disposing of cases. But a legislature must ordinarily look
beyond existing sources of law in deciding what new legal norms will be.
In doing so, it is almost always acting with a substantive end — as valued
in some extralegal social, political or ethical order — in sight. This is so
even if that end is, for example, a regime of contract law that takes no
account of values other than the desirability of enforcing private agreements. The creation of a status neutral legal order can itself be a substantive
goal. Thus, legal autonomy is, as an empirical matter, partial in two senses.
It is partial in that legal norms to some extent, but not completely,
reinstitutionalize in the law norms and interests rooted in non-legal political,
ethical and social spheres. It is also partial in that the application of legal
norms reflects, to some extent, the social and political situation of the
parties to a dispute and the influence of extralegal norms and interests on
legal decision making. I shall now contrast this view of legal autonomy
with the theory of autopoiesis. My goal in doing so is to shed light on the
latter.

Visions Compared
At first blush, it may appear that my version of the Anglo-American view
of autonomy and Luhmann's Continental view are completely incompatible.

17

By "self-regarding" I mean that only the requirements of the law are attended to in
deciding how a dispute should be resolved. The implications of extra-legal power and
normative orders are not considered.
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A u t o p o i e t i c systems are contrasted by L u h m a n n and others to earlier
visions of open systems in a w a y that suggests a complete and radical
autonomy. A l l meaning — that is anything meaningful — w i t h i n an
autopoietic system is a p r o d u c t o f the system and n o t b o r r o w e d f r o m the
e n v i r o n m e n t (Luhmann, 1 9 8 5 a; 1 9 8 5 b). Nevertheless, there are interesting
points of congruence between the t w o approaches. 1 8

Points in Common
F o r L u h m a n n the a u t o n o m y o f the legal system only exists in the context
of its autopoiesis (Luhmann, 1987), w h i c h requires that the reproduction
of the elements of the system be guaranteed in a recursively closed fashion
by the elements of the system. It is the system w h i c h t h r o u g h self-reference
distinguishes itself f r o m the e n v i r o n m e n t and defines itself (Luhmann,
1987). Since the elements of social systems and subsystems are f o u n d in
patterns o f communication (supra: 17) this perspective on a u t o n o m y implies
as a core proposition that it is f o r the legal system t o say w h a t is legal
(Luhmann, 1 9 8 5 d: 7; 1 9 8 5 c; 1 1 3 ; supra: 15; 1 9 8 5 a: 5).
W h i l e this perspective w h i c h makes legal a u t o n o m y an implication of
the legal system's autopoiesis 1 9 has a d i f f e r e n t focus than a conception

18

19

I shall not try to summarize Luhmann's perspective; I shall simply plunge in, drawing
on and criticizing Luhmann's argument where appropriate. I should note also, that
in discussing Luhmann's work, I am limited to that material which has been translated
into English. By and large this work is, as a body, interesting and coherent, but there
are places where an argument in one paper appears inconsistent with an argument in
another as well as places where the translated version was not easily understood. In
addition, some language is ambiguous, a problem that is compounded by a dearth of
examples.
For this reason, except in "Some Problems with Reflexive Law" (Luhmann, 1987)
which makes explicit the fact that in Luhmann's view autonomy is an implication of
and can exist only in the context of autopoiesis, Luhmann rarely uses the term
"autonomy" in his discussion of the legal system. It is, however, clear both in the
reflexive law paper and in other work that autopoietically organized subsystems are
from Luhmann's perspective autonomous, both in their communicative closure and
in their relations to other systems. Indeed, Luhmann is at various points concerned
with how law as an autonomous system can relate to other systems of society and
the tensions posed by the fact that law must remain cognitively open in order to
fulfill its distinctive social function (See, e.g., Luhmann, 1984: 7, 13; 1985c: 111 —
15; supra: 17; 1985 a: 5, 12, 25). Thus, in discussing Luhmann's vision of the autonomy
of legal systems and comparing it to my own I shall draw heavily on the features
that Luhmann sees as essential if law is to persist as an autopoietically organized social
subsystem, for these features are from his perspective essential to its autonomy.
Ultimately I shall suggest that this perspective is misguided, for autopoiesis and
autonomy should not be equated.
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which sees an autonomous legal system as "one which in the ideal case is
independent of other sources of power and authority in social life," there
are in fact substantial similarities between the two. This is because selfreferential closure with respect to communications is in the Anglo-American
view as I present it an important feature, and perhaps the most important
feature, in distancing the legal system from other systems that might
influence it. Thus, the factor that is most important in establishing or
maintaining legal autonomy is judicial formalism which entails (1) a concern
for procedure; (2) a concern for rules; and (3) a concern for legal categories.
These three concerns all require that a legal system decides cases by
reference to its own norms and values, thus requiring the kind of selfreferential closure that is at the heart of Luhmann's conception of
autopoiesis and autonomy. Both models require that the legal system,
if it is autonomous, determine for itself (i. e., by reference to legal
norms) the relevance and implications of information presented to it
(Luhmann, 1985 d: 7; 1985 c: 113-14; 1985 a: 5; supra: 17; 1987). The
two views part company, however, with respect to the other ingredients
that the Anglo-American view sees as important to the autonomy of
applied law, equal legal competence and status neutral law, as well as
in their characterizations of legislation. I shall probe the various points
of divergence for what they imply for the theoretical adequacy of the
autopoietic view of legal systems and for the theoretical utility of the
different concepts of legal autonomy.

The Views Diverge
When legal autonomy is defined, as I define it, in terms of the (material)
independence of applied law from other sources of power and authority in
social life, attention is naturally drawn to the question of whether the
language of the law is itself a repository of extra-legal values and to the
question of whether a law which is purportedly blind to the extralegal
characteristics of parties is in fact applied without regard to and unconditioned by such characteristics. For Luhmann, these questions regarding
language and application are uninteresting and apparently — as a matter
of definition — have nothing to do with the autonomy of the legal system.
The importation of extralegal values into the legal system is not recognized
in Luhmann's theory as a potential threat to autonomy, because neither of
the two ways in which importation can occur creates problems in
Luhmann's scheme.
On the one hand extralegal values may be translated into legal language
through ordinary legal processes, as when a court, responding to an
extralegal vision of efficiency or justice decides that strict liability should
replace the negligence liability standard in cases involving defective prod-
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ucts. Since the legal system is determining for itself and putting in legal
language a new rule, even if the rule is rooted in values that may be
observed in environmental institutions, we have, in Luhmann's scheme,
autopoiesis in action and the preservation of autonomy rather than a
breakdown of boundaries due to the infiltration of extralegal values into
law. So long as communications on the issue remain distinctively legal,
close correlations between action in the legal sphere and actions in other
spheres do not disturb autonomy. Indeed, such correlations are to be
expected in a social world of autopoietic systems, for without such correlations social life would not cohere. Thus, Luhmann writes:
There may be political control of legislation, but only the law can change the law.
Only within the legal system can the change of legal norms be perceived as change
of the law (1985 c: 113).

Not only does this imply that legislation need not be law, a topic I shall
treat later, but it also suggests that if the legal system changes in response
to legislation so that its norms reflect the same extralegal values that
motivated the legislature, the law does not thereby become less autonomous. In Luhmann's scheme a response by the legal system to its environment does not disturb its autopoiesis so long as it is the legal system's
own principles and observations that determine the response (Luhmann,
1985 c: 114). The Anglo-American approach, as I describe it, sees the
incorporation of extralegal values into law as a threat to autonomy even
if the legal system's own rules call for such incorporation.
On the other hand, political, economic or ethical values might be
imposed on the law as when certain disputes are taken from courts and
channelled to institutions that are expected to respond not to the implications of legal language but on the basis of widely shared political or ethical
values or when courts are pressured to reach politically expedient or morally
correct decisions rather than decisions justified by the close consideration
of legal language. In these instances the inattention to or disregard of legal
values means that case decisions do not reflect the outcome of those selfreferential communicative processes that are the hallmark of autopoiesis
and autopoietic autonomy. Yet this situation which limits or destroys legal
autonomy in the Anglo-American view also does not threaten the autonomy
that Luhmann posits. Rather it shrinks the domain in which legal action
occurs while expanding the domain in which the political, religious, economic or other system operates (Luhmann, 1985 c: 121, supra: 31). Thus
in Luhmann's scheme efforts to make law more politically instrumental do
not aim at the transformation of law but rather seek to replace it by other
systems (Luhmann, 1985 c: 123). Indeed, law as a system could be virtually
eliminated in Luhmann's scheme without, until the point of elimination,
losing its autopoietic organization or autonomy. Moreover, the institutional
forms of law, e. g., courts, could persist in such a shrunken system even if
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much of their activity did not count as legal action, for it is not institutional
arrangements that are crucial to Luhmann's conception of autonomy,
but the self-referential quality of the communications that occurs within
institutions.
For similar reasons Luhmann's conception of autonomy is not threatened
by a situation in which differences in party competence mean that the law
as applied systematically favors some social groups at the expense of others.
The fact that the wealthy do better than the poor when they invoke the
law has no implications for autonomy as autopoiesis so long as the legal
process treats the inputs that wealth allows parties to provide solely in
terms of their systemically defined legal implications. The Anglo-American
view recognizes that the ability to structure transactions in legal terms or
to effectively present legally relevant information varies with social class
and has the potential to transform neutral, self-referentially defined language
into language that has systematic implications for the relative success of
competing extralegally defined interests.

Definitional Desiderata
The divergence between the two conceptions of legal autonomy on these
issues highlights two issues that must be confronted in deciding whether
a conception of legal autonomy is sociologically useful. The first is at the
level of definition: what do we want legal autonomy to mean? For Luhmann
it appears to be simply another way of characterizing the self-contained
closure of systems that maintain themselves through autopoiesis. He tells
us that all operations within the legal system "are recursively conditioned
and precisely this constitutes the unity and autonomy of the system"
(Luhmann, 1987). This conception emphasizes the possibility of self-contained communicative systems that are capable of understanding the world
from a consistent system-defined perspective. Whether fully recursive social
systems in fact exist is an empirical question, but clearly systems like the
law impose distinctive (in the case of law, distinctively legal) meanings
which can be made sense of and manipulated only by reference to other
system-defined meanings (Luhmann, 1985 a: 5; see generally 1985 b).
The Anglo-American perspective, on the other hand, treats legal autonomy as a phenomenon that involves more than simply establishing, in a
recursive fashion, the terms for legal discussion. Its use of the concept of
autonomy is motivated by its answer to the question of why the ability to
set the terms for legal discussion matters. This ability matters because it
means, at least potentially, that various extralegal values will not penetrate
the law and make it a tool for the reproduction and extension of extralegal
social, political and ethical arrangements. If legal language, at its core,
systematically distinguishes between the interests and values of extralegally-
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defined classes of actors or if procedures for triggering legal action result
in such distinctions whatever the formal qualities of legal language, such
reproduction will occur. The Anglo-American concept of legal autonomy
allows us to distinguish such situations, from situations where law is less
reflective of and less systematically affects the political and moral struggles
that occur in the law's environment. Luhmann's conception of autonomy
as autopoiesis does not. We must ask of each concept whether it promises
to be useful in social scientific characterizations of and attempts to order
the empirical world, and we should also be concerned with how each
version accords with the ordinary meaning of the term "autonomy".
My view is that the utility of the concept of autonomy is limited if as
a matter of definition it is equated with autopoiesis or treated as a necessary
correlate thereof. While the theoretical writing on autopoiesis, including
some of Luhmann's, suggests this equation or at least the correlation, it is
important to note that Luhmann's perspective does not require that autopoiesis and autonomy be conceptually linked. 20 Autonomy can be meaningful only to an external observer, who can simultaneously appreciate the
integrity of self-contained communications systems and the ways in which
communications within such systems are conditioned by environmental
factors. 21 Accepting Luhmann's perspective, we can say that the less conditioned the meanings in one system by differences in another, the more
autonomous the first system. This separates autopoiesis and autonomy and
provides a definition of autonomy that takes account of the relations
between systems and not just communicative closure.

Theoretical Utility
A more serious problem with equating autopoiesis and autonomy stems
from another kind of implication which this equation has for the theoretical
utility of the concept. Autopoiesis is, for Luhmann, an all or nothing
condition. A system either maintains its autopoiesis and continues to exist
as a distinct entity or it ceases to reproduce itself autopoietically and system
boundaries disappear (Luhmann, 1985 a: 25 — 6). Legal autonomy in the
Anglo-American tradition is a "more or less" thing. Not only does it make

20

21

Luhmann acknowledges that in a system which is simultaneously open and closed
like the legal system self-reference cannot amount to total self-determination or
even total self-observation (Luhmann, supra: 21). A legal system's forms must take
cognizance of the external world (Luhmann, supra: 23).
Since autopoietic social subsystems are cognitively open to their environments, it is
possible for meanings in such systems to be entirely self-defined yet reflective of and
in this sense conditioned on how the system views itself in relation to its environment
(cf. Teubner, 1984).
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sense to speak of partial autonomy, but it makes sense to describe some
legal systems as more autonomous than others (compare Iran and Great
Britain) and some kinds of law as more autonomous than others (compare
contract law and welfare law).
Social science advances through the investigation of variance. The social
scientist seeks to explain perceived differences in social life, by looking at
factors that concomitantly vary. Some factors, like gender, naturally have
only two states, but others exhibit a range of variation. To constrain the
latter to only two states is to ignore interesting complexities of social life,
to impoverish both descriptive and explanatory theory and to pose special
problems for the statistical analysis of quantitative data. Even if Luhmann
is correct and autopoiesis is a natural dichotomy, it does not follow that
legal autonomy should be so conceived. The cost of doing so is to suggest
that legal systems are either autonomous or not autonomous and to define
away a number of interesting questions about the mutual dependence and
interpenetration of systems. This, of course, is precisely what autopoiesis
is about; it suggests a radical integrity to systems which makes language
like "mutual dependence" and "the interpenetration of systems" and the
modes of thought they represent obsolete. 22 But the radical integrity of
autopoietic systems should not be seen as a species of autonomy in the
Anglo-American sense of the term.
If the theory of autopoiesis requires this equation, the costs of imposing
the binary structure of autopoiesis on autonomy become a reason to doubt
the theoretical utility of autopoiesis as a tool for understanding legal
systems. Ultimately too many interesting questions are either ignored or
reduced to matters of definition. For example, from the Anglo-American
perspective the observation that law hews to system values (i.e., distinctively legal values) because it is autonomous gives rise to a host of questions
that might be sociologically explored. These questions, such as the question
of how law maintains its distance from those environmental interests
which would capture it, suggest yet more focused inquiries, such as an
investigation into the structure of the legal profession and how this
structure may serve to insulate legal action from extralegal political pressures. Luhmann, on the other hand, suggests that whatever values the law
22

Luhmann argues that there can be no communication of a society with its environment
and that this implies that if a social system communicates with its environment, it is
in effect reconstituting itself into a more encompassing system (Luhmann, supra:
18—19). Thus, if Luhmann's scheme is consistent with any vision of partial autonomy,
and I shall argue later that it is, it is not consistent with a scheme in which forces
within and without the legal system speak the same language. An apparent implication
of this is that institutions like the jury system, which allow judgments that reflect
popular morality to be pronounced as legal judgments, would render decisions nonlegal in Luhmann's scheme whereas they only diminish the autonomy of the legal
system in the Anglo-American view.
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hews to are system (distinctively legal) values in that they are the product
of the autopoietic reproduction of legal norms which is the embodiment
of the system's autonomy. Moreover, in autopoietic legal systems such laws
will themselves be the product of legal action (Luhmann, 1985 c: 113). The
scheme does not lend itself to understanding the reasons for the quality of
any particular law or the relationships between legal norms and other
sources of power and authority in social life. 23

Normative Closure and Cognitive Openness
The theory of autopoiesis does, however, hold open a link between conditions in the legal and other systems even though it does not suggest how
the link is forged. Law as an autopoietic system, Luhmann tells us, is
closed and open at the same time (Luhmann, 1985 d: 6 — 7; 1985 c: 113 —
14; supra: 19—21). It is cognitively open to its environment in the sense
that it can learn if reality turns out to be not as expected and it is
normatively closed in the sense that legal norms will persist even if the
expectations they entail are not met (Luhmann, supra: 19 — 20).
This suggests that there may be substantially less distance than our use
of language would imply between Luhmann's vision of a legal system
characterized by that apparently radical version of autonomy called autopoiesis and my vision, in the Anglo-American tradition, of a legal system
which both conceptually and empirically is at most partially autonomous.
In one sense this supposition is correct. Luhmann's portrayal of the
autopoietic legal system describes a system that is from an Anglo-American
perspective only partially autonomous since it is open to the influence of
external forces (Luhmann, 1985 c: 114; supra: 20—21). Far from being
radically autonomous, autopoietic systems are open to the world in that
their actions — even if carried on as self-reflective communications — vary
with environmental activity. In another sense, however, substantial distance
remains, for what is crucial to the Anglo-American view that legal autonomy is at best partial is the idea that law is open to normative influences from
extralegal sources of power and authority. Luhmann's vision postulates a
legal system that is closed in a normative sense. Without normative closure

23

One might see many of the questions that I think a sociological theory of law should
allow us to address as rearising when one turns to the question of how the legal
system can maintain its autopoiesis/autonomy given that law is part of a more
encompassing social system. This might be the case, but the start that Luhmann
makes in responding to this question which has to do with a postulated unique
function of law and the closed communication system this engenders, like the theory
of autopoiesis itself, tends to answer questions by definition rather than to pose them
in the form of refutable hypotheses open to empirical investigation.
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the autopoiesis of law and its ability to fill what Luhmann sees as its
distinctive function would cease.
While it is true that a legal norm (i. e. a law) does not change simply
because not everyone complies with it, if the idea of normative closure is
to amount to anything important it must mean more than this. At a
minimum one would think that the claim of normative closure means that
law follows distinctly legal principles and does not embody the normative
agenda of any particular political or social groups. One would also expect
it to mean that law as applied restates its normative implications without
regard to the social or political characteristics of those before it. 24 Both
propositions are, as an empirical matter, palpably false and are major reasons
why: (1) actual legal systems are only partially autonomous; (2) it is
instructive to view the degree of legal autonomy as a variable; and (3) the
degree of legal autonomy is important for other qualities we value in social
life.
But how can Luhmann be so wrong about such a fundamental and easy
to spot matter as the fact that legal systems are not normatively closed?
He cannot, I am sure. I must misunderstand him, or — to say much the
same thing — be using language in a very different way.
But in what particular do I misunderstand Luhmann? 25 Perhaps I misunderstand the entire enterprise. Perhaps Luhmann simply means to be
dealing with law in the abstract as a closed communication system. On this
view, so long as the legal system responds to pressures on it by translating
non-legal language into legal language, autopoiesis is maintained
(Luhmann, supra: 18—19). This would suggest that if the political system
sends a message to a court that X, a leading dissenter, must be gotten rid
of, and the legal system labels X guilty, the system maintains its autopoiesis.
24

25

It appears that Luhmann has a proposition like this in mind when he suggests that
no legally relevant event can derive its normativity from the environment of the
system (Luhmann, supra: 20). Perhaps Luhmann means something special by "derive
its normativity" which makes the proposition true by definition. If not, the proposition
appears to be contradicted by the use of legal standards such as "good faith," the
relation between legal and cultural values embodied in malum in se crimes and the
place given to juries or lay assessors in many systems of law. While it is true that the
norms thereby derived are legal because the legal system treats them as such, it is
also the case that they represent the penetration of extralegal values directly into the
legal system, and it may also be the case that the legal system had no real choice
about accepting the values in question.
The suggestion that I must misunderstand Luhmann is neither a pretense nor intended
as a rhetorical device. I am driven toward it by my reading of Luhmann's argument,
my view of the place of law in society and my respect for Luhmann as a social
theorist. No doubt the suggestions that follow are not the only ways in which I may
have misread Luhmann, and I welcome suggestions which do not limit the utility or
scope of his theory in the ways that the readings I sketch below, which are the most
plausible readings in my view, do.
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This is a far cry from the Anglo-American view of autonomy, but it also
seems distant from what Luhmann means by autopoiesis because the system
in this example is not self-regarding except in the most limited definitional
sense. Rather it is looking for guidance to another system. Indeed, Luhmann
would probably go further than I and argue that not only was the legal
system not autonomous, but also that what I have described is a political
rather than a legal action (Luhmann, 1985 c: 122).26
Alternatively Luhmann may be treating autopoiesis as I treat perfect
autonomy, that is as an ideal type, which is not and cannot be achieved,
but which aids our understanding of the law because it clarifies our thinking
about an important, partially achieved aspect of actual legal systems. If so,
it is unfair to confront Luhmann's portrait of normative closure with
examples of how law appears normatively open and to suggest that this
invalidates his view about the central distinguishing feature of law.
Luhmann, however, does not present his view of law as one would present
an ideal type. Indeed at various points in his writing, he suggests that if a
legal system is to exist at all it can only exist as an ongoing process of
autopoiesis (Luhmann, supra: 17 — 18).
Finally, I may be wrong in suggesting that Luhmann cannot mean to
confine the idea of normative closure simply to the proposition that when
normative expectations are disappointed (i.e., laws are broken) they are
not changed. But if this is what Luhmann means, what appeared to be a
radical perspective on the autonomy of law and the concomitant closure
of the legal system instead makes only the relatively trivial point that norms
are not defined by instances of individual action but are the standards by
which society both tries to influence action and later judges it. This, of
course, is characteristic of any normative system, closed or open. Norms,
as Luhmann recognizes, can only develop by reference to deviant behavior
(Luhmann, supra: 25). If norms changed so as to accord with whatever
behavior occurred, they would not be norms.
If Luhmann seeks to make the broader statement that the legal system
is normatively closed in the sense that its norms are not only maintained
despite individual deviation but are also maintained despite aggregate
deviation, then I think he is, as an empirical matter, mistaken. The claim
that "everybody does it" may constitute an effective defense in law, and
26

But see the preceding footnote. Perhaps if pressures on the legal system were more
subtle so that the legal system was translating popular morality as observed in the
system's environment into a set of expectations rather than simply a pronouncement
in an individual case, Luhmann would see the new rule as law and see the need to
translate the environmental norm into a legal system as the essence of normative
closure. If Luhmann's view allows the legal system to be so permeable to extralegal
norms and interests, he and I mean very different things by an autonomous legal
system, and his vision disguises a potentially overwhelming impact of other systems
on the substantive normative content of the law.
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some legal standards, like the standard of the reasonable person in AngloAmerican tort law, are explicitly open to specification by reference to
aggregate behavior. 27 Moreover, what everybody does is often directly
introduced into the law's structure as when the British common law grew
to incorporate much of the law merchant or the drafters of the American
Uniform Commercial Code looked to business practice to resolve difficult
questions of legal policy.
If Luhmann's conception of normative closure is more restrictive than
its centrality in the autopoietic process would lead us to believe, its
complement, the cognitive openness of law, must entail more than what
one might otherwise have thought. Luhmann is, unfortunately, not very
clear about what the cognitive openness of law entails. At some points, he
suggests that this means that the legal system is capable of understanding
the facts of cases and reaching decisions (i. e., normative judgments) given
the facts it hears (Luhmann, 1985 d: 9; 1987). This suggestion is clearly
correct. At a minimum law must be open in this way.
What is less clear in Luhmann's scheme is whether cognitive openness
extends to an appreciation of the political and social forces in the legal
system's environment that may be manifested in the generation of legal
norms that reflect external distributions of power. When, for example, Mr.
Dooley said, "Th' supreme coort follows the iliction returns," (Dunne,
1963: 52) was he describing the capstone of a system which was not
autopoietic in Luhmann's sense of the term, or was he describing the
capstone of an autopoietic system that was cognitively open in a way
Luhmann's theory allows? If the narrow reading of "normative closure"
that I suggest above is accurate, then the idea of cognitive openness has
this latter expansive scope. The judicial consideration of election returns
becomes part of the ongoing autopoietic process so long as the court
specifies in legal language the legal implications of the political world it
observes.
If this is the proper reading of Luhmann, it means that there are
few important differences between the Anglo-American theory of legal
autonomy that I espouse and the role that autopoietic theory, in fact, allows
environmental influences. Both approaches see "partial autonomy" in the
sense I use this term as the most that is possible and both approaches posit
a system that is continually vulnerable to the influence of external social
and political forces. Finally, and most importantly, both approaches see in
the language of the law and the system's ability to maintain the integrity
27

Luhmann might call this an example of cognitive openness which his theory allows,
and not an example of normative openness which is not permitted if the system is to
maintain its autopoiesis. If so, and the claim is plausible in Luhmann's scheme, the
example illustrates the limited scope of Luhmann's concept of normative closure and
the fuzzy boundary between the normative and the cognitive.
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of that language the key to the degree o f a u t o n o m y that is in fact achieved.
The "radical integrity" of autopoietic systems is, h o w e v e r , not v e r y radical.
It allows f o r considerable encroachment by other systems. Indeed, it
allows f o r the possibility that b e h a v i o r in one system, including n o r m a t i v e
definitions, 2 8 will change almost in lockstep w i t h b e h a v i o r in another.

A Further Comparison
If, h o w e v e r , there is this kind of rapprochement between these t w o views,
there are, in m y opinion, substantial reasons to p r e f e r the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
perspective on a u t o n o m y t o one w h i c h sees it as a feature of the autopoietic
unity of systems. 2 9 First, there are definitional advantages. Luhmann's

28

29

Normative definitions would still have to be maintained when they are violated to
satisfy Luhmann's condition, but if this is all the condition means, norms — legal
norms for example — could be changed rapidly and routinely when environmental
forces demand it.
I have already suggested a number of theoretical and empirical difficulties with
Luhmann's approach, on other interpretations of what he means. Luhmann in responding to this paper when it was presented implied an advantage to autopoietic theory
when he asked whether my version of autonomy allows for increasing independence
and dependence at the same time. I am not one who sees theoretical virtue in apparent
paradoxes, so unless one could show empirically that actual legal systems had over
time become simultaneously both more (or less) independent and dependent I would
not be troubled if this condition were not met. However, for those who would be
troubled if this apparently paradoxical condition could not be met, I should point
out that the Anglo-American idea of autonomy allows it. To see how this is possible,
first consider an example distant from law. Suppose a farmer devotes 50% of his land
to his own subsistence and 50% to growing crops for a patron who is his only access
to a market. From one perspective the farmer enjoys considerable independence. He
can devote half his land to growing whatever he desires, and even if the patron were
to buy nothing, he could probably — albeit barely — survive. But at the same time,
he is quite dependent because a substantial portion of his well-being depends on his
patron. Thus he will probably plant whatever crops the patron desires; he will use
the seeds the patron provides; he will harvest according to the patron's schedule
rather than his own, and if there were a drought he would probably irrigate the
patron's land more generously than his own to preserve the patron's future custom.
Now assume the farmer develops more outlets to market, and with the prospect of
hundreds of buyers for his crops, he decides to devote 90% of his land to farming
for others and only 10% to his own subsistence. Clearly, he is more dependent.
Should no one purchase his crops, he will starve, for he does not grow enough to
meet his needs. At the same time, he is far freer. With many potential buyers, he may
choose what he will grow and how he will grow it, and he need not fear alienating
specific buyers should he take better care of his substistence acreage than that on
which he is growing crops for others.
The Anglo-American perspective on legal autonomy allows for a similar phenomenon
in the legal sphere. The legal system may have a large sphere in which it is largely
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autonomy (as autopoiesis) is under this last view of what cognitive openness
allows, equivalent to "partial autonomy" in the scheme I advance. Thus,
there is no place for "full autonomy" or autonomy as an ideal type in
Luhmann's scheme, and theoretical discourse on this topic is concomitantly
limited.
Second, if the two modes of speaking amount to the same thing,
Luhmann's approach introduces unnecessary theoretical baggage and so
fails the test of Ockham's razor. 30 We do not need to talk of autopoiesis
and all that that entails nor do we need to worry about the correspondence
of legal and social systems in order to understand and speak meaningfully
of legal autonomy. Moreover, the Anglo-American view offers a better
understanding of how forces in the legal system's environment affect and
are restrained by communication within the legal system than that which
one acquires from Luhmann's somewhat opaque injunction that legal
systems are normatively closed and cognitively open.
Finally, the Anglo-American view I advance deals more adequately with
the place of legislation in the legal system. Legislation is, unabashedly, an
institution that channels political judgments and the external forces they
reflect into the legal system. This characteristic feature of legislation remains
even though these external forces may be restrained and shaped both by
norms that define the proper behavior of legislatures as legal institutions
and by legal norms that affect the way courts interpret and apply legislative
enactments.
In Luhmann's scheme legislation has no clear role. It even appears at
times that legislation — a central reality of modern legal systems — is

30

self-regarding and unaffected by external interests, but vulnerability to direction from
certain extralegal interests may make it highly responsive to them. Thus, in a
dictatorship, substantial areas of private law may be left purely to the self-regarding
principles of the law, but the system as a whole may be vulnerable to the dictator's
(polity's) influence whenever it suits him. Or 40% of a legislature may be controlled
by mining interests, yielding a body of law that is especially solicitious of mining
although in areas unrelated to mining largely independent of extralegal social pressure.
In another society, numerous influences may impinge on a legal system so that judges
and legislatures respond to a large variety of extra-legal interests. Yet the very variety
of interests and the countervailing power they bring to bear may mean that the legal
system reflects distinctively legal values more than it does any identifiable external
value set. Thus total but conflicting dependence may free legal decision makers to
hew on the average more closely to distinctively legal values than they would, on the
average, if the legal system had to be highly responsive to extra-legal pressures in
certain areas but not at all responsive in others.
Unless, of course, Luhmann's theory fits into a larger, coherent theoretical whole in
a way the version I am arguing for does not. Note, however, that even if one accepts
Luhmann's more general theory of the autopoiesis of social systems (1985 a; see also
1985 b) as such a whole, the Anglo-American perspective on legal autonomy may be
consistent with it. See note 18, supra, and the discussion that accompanies it.
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inconsistent with the autopoiesis which is the distinguishing feature of law
as a subsystem of society (Luhmann, 1985 c: 122 — 25). For example, at one
point Luhmann suggests that regulatory law, which is typically legislative
or quasi-legislative rule making, exploits the law in a manner alien to its
function and threatens to undermine its ability to regenerate itself
(Luhmann, supra: 28). Indeed, when we contrast the role of legislation and
judicial decisions in Luhmann's scheme there is an irony in characterizing
Luhmann's vision as "Continental." His vision of autopoiesis appears quite
close to the ordinary Anglo-American perspective on how common law
courts produce and reproduce the law (Luhmann, 1985 c: 117; supra: 29;
1987).
We see this in Luhmann's view of the function of law. For Luhmann, a
precise definition of the function of law is: "using the possibility of conflict
for a generalization of expectations in temporal, social and substantive
aspects" (Luhmann, 1985 c: 121 at note 24; see also Luhmann, infra: 17).31
This view of law's function fits the judicial process better than the legislative
one. Courts focus on actual conflict (realized possibilities). In the process
of resolving conflicts presented to them, courts can and do reaffirm existing
norms, overtly change norms, or contribute to bodies of precedent that
carry with them the germs of new normative standards and so contribute
to the ongoing self-referential reconstitution of the law that Luhmann calls
autopoiesis.
Legislation, on the other hand, need not focus on realized conflicts but
deals only with possibilities. This becomes particularly problematic when
possible conflicts would not exist but for the legislation. Thus some
legislation can be fit into Luhmann's scheme only by suggesting that
legislation may create a possibility of conflict for the apparent purpose of
using the created conflict as the occasion for the generation of legal
expectations. But since it is the generation of legal norms that creates the

31

Luhmann (1985 c: 121 at note 24) also argues that a more general definition like
"contributing" to the order of society would confer on anything the status of being
a functional equivalent to law. This suggests to me that Luhmann's more restrictive
functional definition results from reflecting not on how law serves society, but by
searching for one unique way in which law serves society. This in turn appears mandated
by Luhmann's view that autopoietic subsystems must by definition be fully distinguished from each other and can as a matter of logic be so distinguished only if each
fills a unique function. One reason why I have difficulty with Luhmann's portrayal
of law as an autopoietic system is that I don't subscribe to his underlying functionalist
theory of society, especially insofar as it uniquely allocates social subsystems to
functions. Indeed, it does not seem to me that the function Luhmann uniquely assigns
to law — using the possibility of conflict to generate norms — is at all necessary to
the ongoing functioning of a society. So long as conflicts are resolved, or can be
forestalled, I do not see how it matters whether it was the possibility of conflict or
some other feature of social life that led to the legal norm.
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possibility of conflict (Luhmann, 1985 a: 28), the functional perspective
makes little sense. Indeed, the matter may be more convoluted still, for at
one point Luhmann suggests that what legislation does is not to create
legal norms, but to conjure up conflict out of nothingness in the expectation
that law will be formed out of the orientation that law takes to the conjured
up conflict (Luhmann, supra: 27). 32 I find this circularity unhelpful, and
its functional basis somewhat mysterious. Any theory that forces us into
such circles should be avoided if a plausible alternative is available.
Moreover, even this view does not fully resolve the ambiguity of the place
that legislation occupies in Luhmann's scheme. Luhmann tells us that it is
difficult to see how legal doctrine can develop amid the turbulence of frequent
legislative enactments, thus implying that much legislation is not law but
something that threatens it (Luhmann, 1985 c: 125). Perhaps it threatens the
ongoing autopoiesis of law as Luhmann sees it, but if the price of hewing to
the autopoietic theory of law is that much legislation must be seen as something other than law or as external to the legal system, I think it is the theory
of autopoiesis and not the notion that legislatures make law that should be
discarded. Recognizing, as in the Anglo-American scheme, that the legislative
process is not autonomous from non-legal sources of power and influence
and that substantively oriented legislatures are a major force limiting legal
autonomy is one way of making the link between legislative action and the
legal system without thereby denying that law may still have a life of its own
or that self-referential processes may continue to play an essential role in the
application and generation of legal norms.

Summary
Lest I be misunderstood let me summarize what I see as the goals of this
article and the conclusions that may be drawn from it.
32

Luhmann also speaks of legislation as "predeciding" conflicts (Luhmann, supra: 28).
This perspective I find more helpful, for it is easy to see the functional value of a
system that appreciates the likelihood of conflicts it does not create and establishes
rules for resolving them. It is difficult to make sense of an argument that suggests
that conflicts — perhaps by granting rights that create a clash of interests that did
not theretofore exist — are created so that they may be the occasion for generating
norms that predecide them. It also appears that legislation cannot be distinguished
from adjudication on the predeciding dimension. Modern theories of precedent
recognize that in deciding legal issues appellate courts look forward as well as back
and attempt to establish rules to govern future conflicts. Indeed, courts also conjure
up conflicts as when in overturning legal restrictions on abortion the possibility of
hitherto non-existent conflicts — like the conflict between parents and minor daughter
over whether the daughter can get an abortion — arise to be resolved by the court
at a later date. Generally speaking, conflicts like this are inescapable by products of
changing law in the context of cases and are not conjured up to provide further
occasion for making new law.
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1. My goal has been to elucidate, question and point up gaps in Luhmann's
theory of the autopoietic social system as applied specifically to law. I have
posed my version of the Anglo-American theory of legal autonomy not to
convince readers that it is correct, but as a way of highlighting problematic
aspects of Luhmann's theory. 33
2. My focus has been on the issue of legal autonomy. I have suggested
that the theory of the autopoietic legal system is not satisfactory as a theory
of legal autonomy. My argument for this conclusion should not be taken as
a total criticism of Luhmann's theory of autopoietic social systems, either
generally or as applied to the legal system. However, in the course of
exploring the adequacy of Luhmann's theory as a theory of legal autonomy,
more general and fundamental problems have been revealed. For example:
a) There is considerable ambiguity and some inconsistency in the way the
theory of autopoiesis and its application to the legal system is expounded
by Luhmann and others. In particular the sense in which the legal system
is "normatively closed and cognitively open" must be more fully and clearly
specified.
b) The theory of the autopoietic legal system best fits a system of common
law legal reproduction in which courts draw on legal sources to make new
law. If the theory is to encompass adequately the role of legislation and
administrative regulations in modern legal systems considerable work must
be done. A theory which does not treat legislation and administrative
regulation as law cannot serve as a general theory of legal reproduction in
modern society.
c) The theory of the autopoietic legal system may appear to encompass
more than it does. There is the possibility that the theory is to a large
extent either true trivially or by definition and the concomitant possibility
that while Luhmann is correct and the legal system does reproduce itself
autopoietically this insight adds little to our understanding of the growth
and implications of law. For example, if the legal system's sphere of
normative closure is tiny and its sphere of cognitive openness is large,
understanding legal change may require considerably more attention to
conditions in the law's environment than it does to the mechanisms of
reproduction. Similarly if a system cannot by definition encroach on another
but can, in effect, colonize an activity that was once in the other's domain
(Luhmann, 1985 c: 122), the sphere of autopoietic legal reproduction — as
opposed, for example, to something which looks legal but has a major
political component — may be a relatively small and insignificant compo33

I will not, however, object if anyone is so convinced. For a more detailed treatment,
which also includes a discussion of what I call "pseudo formalism" see chapters 12
and 13 of Lempert and Sanders (1986).
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nent of social life. Those who argue for the autopoiesis of law and for the
theoretical utility of this perspective must define specifically the boundaries
of the autopoietic reproduction of law in modern society and illustrate the
range of problems the theory illuminates.
I do not regard these three criticisms of the theory of law as an autopoietic
system or other criticisms of the general theory that this paper makes or
implies as necessarily unanswerable, and for this reason, I do not reject the
theory out of hand. I do, however, think that answers are sorely needed
and that the potential of the theory cannot be realized unless its proponents
respond clearly and specifically to these and similar challenges.
3. An autopoietic legal system in Luhmann's sense of the term is neither
the same thing as nor does it imply a fully autonomous legal system, in
my sense of the term. If Luhmann or others read the theory to require this
equation or implication, their theory is, in this particular, wrong. I have
shown by example that legal norms and legal behavior are influenced by
actions in the economic, social and ethical spheres. Moreover, to equate
autopoiesis and autonomy entails serious theoretical costs. Imposing the
binary structure of autopoiesis on legal autonomy diminishes the value of
the latter as an explanatory variable and its tractability as a state to be
explained.
4. I do not believe the preceding point is a telling criticism of Luhmann's
use of the concept "autopoiesis" for I do not think he uses it to mean or
entail what I call "legal autonomy". But if autopoiesis is not linked to
autonomy by equation or implication, a theory which sees law as an
autopoietically organized system is, if not mistaken, markedly incomplete.
A concept like the Anglo-American concept of legal autonomy must be
embedded in it, to allow discussion of a range of issues concerning relations
between systems that are integral to understanding both the dynamics of
legal change and the role of law in society. In particular, if the theory of
autopoiesis is not disconfirmed by examples of legal norms that change in
accord with extra-legal behavior, it must be able to accommodate the
examples and should, ideally, offer us a mechanism which explains how
extralegal norms and values come to influence legal norms and behavior
and so in this sense render the legal system less than fully autonomous.
This is particularly important for a general theory of legal systems since
many of the most interesting questions in the contemporary sociology of
law, including most questions about the role law can and does play in the
modern regulatory state, depend on understanding the mechanisms which
render law partially autonomous — that is both independent to some
degree and open to extra-legal influences. The lead that Luhmann offers —
the argument that law is normatively closed and cognitively open — is
both of questionable validity and too general to be of much help. Its
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generality is obvious. Its validity is questionable because what often must
be explained are normative changes in the law associated with extra-legal
pressures. It appears that the only way that this fact may be accommodated
within the theory is by reducing the concept of normative closure to the
rather trivial observation that norms do not change simply because they
are violated. With this interpretation the theory of autopoiesis allows legal
norms to change in response to extra-legal social, economic, or ethical
forces. This may be a correct portrait of what autopoiesis entails, but it is
hardly the picture of system independence that the tenor of the argument
for autopoiesis implies.

Conclusion
These observations are what I see as the heart of what we have learned
from confronting Luhmann's idea of autopoiesis with an Anglo-American
theory of legal autonomy. Treating the idea of autopoiesis not as a metaphor
but as a theory, it appears to be either an erroneous, an inadequate or an
unnecessarily complicated approach to understanding what we mean by
legal autonomy. But the viability of autopoiesis as a theory of legal
autonomy should not be taken as the measure of the theory, for it appears
that Luhmann's theory is not intended to serve the theoretical functions
that the Anglo-American concept of autonomy can fill. The confrontation
of the two perspectives has, however, also suggested important gaps in the
theory of autopoiesis and areas of considerable conceptual confusion. To
state my reservations in their strongest form: I question the wisdom of
elaborating an extensive, complex theory from a base which looks not to
the empirical reality of legal or social systems, but to an arguable reality
of biological systems; a reality that in its own terms is unlike that of social
systems because crucial aspects of both the biological object and its observer
do not and cannot characterize social systems (Luhmann, 1985 c: 122 at
note 26; 1985 a: 2; cf. Rottleuthner, infra).
At the same time, this comparison and critique necessarily slights much
that is interesting in Luhmann. Whatever its theoretical adequacy, autopoiesis may nonetheless have substantial metaphorical value in that researchers may draw important, testable, theoretical insights from pondering the
idea of the autopoietically organized legal system and its possible implications. The best example of the possible fruitfulness of autopoiesis as
metaphor is Luhmann, for if he has not yet developed the idea of autopoiesis
to the point where it offers us a satisfactory, empirically testable theory of
law, he has offered us observations that are insightful, sometimes dazzlingly
so. Luhmann's simple observation that the institution of property is "the
only great delegalizer with a minimum of rules and maximum of effects"
(Luhmann, 1985 c: 121) is I think correct and fruitful in its implications.
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His discussion of legislation and the threats of complexity (Luhmann,
1985 c: 123 — 25; supra: 31 — 33), his explanation of why legislation breeds
more legislation (Luhmann, 1985 c: 124); his observation that, "[IJntact
social systems are more reluctant to juridify their conflicts than fragmented
systems" (Luhmann, 1987); and his discussion of conflict as a way of
resolving difficulties of communications within systems (Luhmann, 1985 a:
27) are similarly helpful and important. 34 If I thought it was necessary to
accept the theory of the autopoiesis of law or the equation of autopoiesis
with autonomy in order to derive or ground such insights, I would feel
compelled to rethink my critique. But I do not see Luhmann's most
insightful conclusions as dependent on the reality of autopoiesis, and I
believe we should be able to discover less complex, better grounded theory
that is consistent with Luhmann's insights and more. Absent such theory,
however, the best we may be able to do is to ask the Luhmann's among
us to ponder the legal system and its problems from whatever perspective
they find the most stimulating. In this lies the value of autopoiesis.
I am grateful to Bruce Frier for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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